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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF : 
PUBLIC SAFETY, 
Petitioner, 
: Case No. 20030155-CA 
v. 
UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW 
BOARD, : 
Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Decision and Final Agency Action of the Career Service Review Board 
(CSRB) was entered on January 28, 2003. R. 295-315. The State of Utah, Department of 
Public Safety's Petition for a Writ of Review was filed on February 27, 2003. This Court 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. 
§63-46b-14(1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The CSRB erred as a matter of law when relied solely on the subjective 
testimony of Trooper John Pace concerning his belief as to whether or not he was 
involved in a vehicular pursuit, and disregarded the question of whether such a pursuit 
actually occurred. 
This issue was raised by the petitioner before the CSRB. R. 220-21, 269-73 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Since this issue raises a question of general law, this 
Court reviews the "CSRB's conclusion for correctness, granting no deference to that 
agency's decision." Holland v. CSRB. 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions and statutes 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 25, 2000, Trooper Ross G. Pace was given a 20-day suspension. R. 34. 
This discipline was supported by the findings of Public Safety's Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) that Pace had committed the following misconduct: 1) performed a vehicular 
pursuit without following the agency's policies relating to such pursuits, 2) taking a lunch 
break without notifying dispatch that he was taking a break, 3) failure to attend a 
mandatory meeting, and 4) twice leaving his assigned duty area and working instead in 
farm fields. R. 35-50. On June 5, 2000, Pace appealed the department's decision to the 
CSRB. R. 1. 
A hearing was held before CSRB Hearing Officer Katherine A. Fox on November 
29-30, 2000. R. 201, 202. In her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision, the 
CSRB's hearing officer upheld the department's decision, finding substantial evidence to 
support each of the charges. R. 170-82. Pace's request for reconsideration was denied on 
March 13, 2001. R. 195-98. Pace appealed to the CSRB on March 25, 2001. R. 199. 
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On May 22, 2002, the CSRB entered is Decision and Order of Remand. R. 235-
57. The CSRB upheld the hearing officer's decision as to the charges concerning Pace's 
failure to notify dispatch that he was taking a lunch break and his failure to attend a 
mandatory meeting. The CSRB overturned the hearing officer's decisions as to the high 
speed pursuit and the first working in a farm field charge, and remanded to the hearing 
officer to reconsider the second charge concerning Pace's leaving his duty area to work in 
a farm field. The hearing officer was also instructed on remand, based on the CSRB's 
decision, to reconsider the proportionality of the 20-day suspension. R. 235-57. 
On remand, the hearing officer found the 20-day suspension to be inappropriate in 
light of the "corrected" findings of fact, and imposed instead a one-day suspension. R. 
258-61. The CSRB entered its Decision and Final Agency Action, sustaining the one-day 
suspension. R. 295-314. The department filed its Petition for Writ of Review on 
February 27, 2003. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Utah's Department of Public Safety defines a vehicular pursuit as "[a]n active 
attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend fleeing suspects 
who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful tactics." R. 59. 
The policy states that officers "may initiate a vehicular pursuit" when three criteria are 
met. 
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or 
unlawful tactics. 
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The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the 
officer. 
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance 
the danger presented to the public. 
R. 59. 
On March 14, 1999, Ross Pace pursued a suspect who had been traveling at very 
high speed. In his incident report, Pace explained: 
On march 14, 1999,1 was eastbound 1-80 at milepost 157. At 
approximately 1825 hours I noticed a red car westbound at a high rate of 
speed. I initiated my radar and received a reading of 92 mph. 
I activated my red lights and started through the median. As he was 
passing me he looked right at me and then sped up. I got turned through the 
median and started to chase him from milepost 157 to milepost 150. I could 
keep track of him in front of me, but at speeds of between 80 and 100 mph I 
was not gaining on him. I gained a little on him at approximately milepost 
150 to 149 when he got blocked in by other traffic. 
He then passed two semis in the right hand emergency lane. As he 
got to Silver Creek Junction he started to take exit to eastbound SR-40. His 
speed was still over 90 mph. He decided not to take the exit and swerved 
back onto westbound 1-80. He went into the fast lane of traffic still at 
speeds of 90 to 100 mph. He passed several more vehicles then swerved 
across both lanes of traffic and went into the westbound rest area. He drove 
halfway through the rest area and stopped. 
I got him out of the car and arrested him for evading. While he was 
in my car I could smell an odor of alcohol coming from the suspects breath. 
When we got to the Summit county Jail, I went through a series of field 
sobriety tests which he failed. He tested a .115 on the intoxilyzer. He was 
arrested for evading and DUI. 
R. 109-10. 
While Pace notified the dispatcher that he needed supporting units, he did not at 
any time inform dispatch that he was in a pursuit. R. 89. A Utah Highway Patrol Pursuit 
Review Board found that Pace had initiated a vehicular pursuit, and that his action in not 
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advising dispatch of his pursuit showed "blatant disregard for his own safety, as well as 
the safety of officers he was calling to assist him." R. 90. The Board found that Pace's 
conduct was a "gross violation of policy." Id. Public Safety's ALJ also found that the 
evidence showed that Pace had initiated a vehicular pursuit without following the 
department's policies. R. 37-38. 
The evidence before the CSRB's hearing officer also showed that a vehicular 
pursuit had taken place. Lieutenant Bardell Hamilton testified that there must have been 
a pursuit if the suspect was properly charged with felony evasion. R. 201 at 98. Sergeant 
Jeff Peterson testified that, relying on the information contained in Pace's incident report 
he concluded that a vehicular pursuit had taken place. R. 201 at 141-42, 146, 204-6. 
Trooper Steven R. Bytheway, a witness called by Pace, had served for fourteen years as 
an instructor of emergency vehicle operation. R. 202 at 281. After reading Pace's 
incident report, Trooper Bytheway testified that the facts contained in the report showed 
that a high-speed pursuit had occurred. R. 202 at 287-88, 290-1. 
Officer Richard Henning, also called by Pace, did testify that the facts stated in the 
incident report did not demonstrate a high-speed pursuit. R. 202 at 308-9. But Henning 
admitted that this opinion was based on his own belief on what constituted a high-speed 
pursuit and not on Public Safety's definition of a vehicular pursuit, admitting that he 
didn't know the policies well enough. R. 202 at 309. Pace testified to the circumstances 
and stated that it was his belief that he had not participated in a pursuit. R. 202 at 325-32. 
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But Pace acknowledged that he had called it a pursuit in his incident report. R. 202 at 
367. Pace further admitted that he had arrested the suspect for evading. R. 202 at 370-1. 
Pace testified, and argued, that is was not a pursuit unless you were in close proximity to 
the suspect. R. 202 at 383. Public Safety's definition of a vehicular pursuit does not 
contain any requirement that the pursuing officer be in close proximity to the suspect. R. 
59. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One of the charges against Ross Pace was that he participated in a vehicular 
pursuit without following Public Safety's policies concerning such pursuits. At every 
level, from the department's ALJ to the CSRB's hearing officer, it was determined that 
there was substantial evidence to support this charge. Instead of considering this 
evidence, the CSRB ruled as conclusion of law that because Pace did not consider his 
actions to constitute a high-speed pursuit1 he could not be charged with conducting such a 
pursuit in violation of policy. This was based on the fact that, by policy, Pace was not 
required to participate in a vehicular pursuit. 
This legal conclusion is erroneous. Such a reading of the policy would mean not 
that an officer had discretion in deciding whether a pursuit should be commenced, but 
rather that he could not be disciplined for actions that constituted a pursuit that were 
conducted in violation of the policy so long as he claimed that he had not been 
1
 Throughout the administrative proceedings, high-speed pursuit was used as 
being interchangeable with vehicular pursuit, the term used by the regulation in question. 
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performing a vehicular pursuit. Such a conclusion is contrary to law and good public 
policy. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CSRB ERRED IN FINDING THAT ROSS PACE HAD THE 
RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER HIS ACTIONS 
CONSTITUTED A VEHICULAR PURSUIT 
Utah's Department of Public Safety pursuit policy defines a vehicular pursuit as 
"[a]n active attempt by an officer in an authorized emergency vehicle to apprehend 
fleeing suspects who are attempting to avoid apprehension through evasive and unlawful 
tactics." R. 59. There is no discretion given to individual officers to create their own 
definitions as to what will constitute a vehicular pursuit. What is left to the discretion of 
the officers is the decision of whether to engage in a vehicular pursuit. The policy states 
that officers "may initiate a vehicular pursuit" when three criteria are met. 
The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid apprehension through evasive or 
unlawful tactics. 
The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the direction of the 
officer. 
The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would further enhance 
the danger presented to the public. 
R. 59. 
When an officer initiates a vehicular pursuit, he is required to comply with the 
pursuit policy, including the requirement that "the pursuing officer immediately notify 
communications center personnel that a pursuit is underway." R. 60. Pace was not 
charged with making a poor decision in initiating a vehicular pursuit. The charge against 
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Pace was that he initiated a vehicular pursuit, as that term is defined by the policy, 
without complying with the policy's requirements. 
The Pursuit Review Board, the department's ALJ and the CSRB's hearing officer 
all reviewed the evidence with this question in mind. All found that the actions of Ross 
Pace on March 14, 1999 constituted a vehicular pursuit. Based on this factual finding, 
each found that Pace had violated Public Safety's pursuit policy and that this constituted 
grounds for discipline. 
The CSRB failed to address this factual issue because it reached an erroneous legal 
conclusion. CSRB conflated two distinct portions of Public Safety's pursuit policy. It 
read into the definition of what constituted a vehicular pursuit a discretion on the part of 
the officer to determine what did or did not meet the definition. 
CHAIRMAN ATKIN: It would be most helpful, at least for me - -
because as I recall, and I reread our opinion, and I'm more convinced of it 
having reread that that what we were doing there, we weren't questioning 
the factual basis for the hearing officer's decision. Rather, we were 
interpreting what I view as legal issues in both of those instances. In the 
first instance with regard to the high speed pursuit, our analysis, though it 
may not have been a crystal clear as it might have been, and we may or may 
not need to clarify that, but our analysis on the high speed pursuit wasn't a 
question of whether somebody else could have thought it was a high speed 
pursuit. We didn't see the hearing officer having determined factually that 
there was a high speed pursuit. Rather, our analysis was that under the 
statute or the regulation, that under the regulation, a high speed pursuit is a 
term of art that's used to describe something that comes into play only after 
the officer has exercised his discretion to determine that it is a high speed 
pursuit. 
It isn't a question of how fast he was going, it isn't a question of 
what he observed, it's not a question of what was happening on the street 
that somebody else might have determined it was a high speed pursuit. I 
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think we determined that it was a high speed pursuit only after the officer 
had exercised that discretion to determine that it was a high speed pursuit. 
And I think that the evidence in that regard is undisputed, that Officer Pace 
testified that he hadn't determined that it was a high speed pursuit. 
R. 316 at 4-5. 
By reading into the definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit an absolute 
discretion on the part of an officer in determining whether his or her actions meet the 
definition, the CSRB has made this policy unenforceable. The Pursuit Review Board and 
Public Safety's ALJ rejected Pace's claim that no pursuit took place because he said no 
pursuit took place (regardless of the objective circumstances and facts to the contrary). 
By adopting this interpretation of the pursuit policy, CSRB effectively precludes Public 
Safety from regulating the manner in which its officers perform vehicular pursuits. All 
officers have to do is claim that they did not believe a pursuit was in progress and no 
review is permissible. 
In Holland v. Career Service Review Board, 856 P.2d 678, 682 (Utah App. 1993), 
this Court used an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a challenge to the 
Department of Human Resource Management's (DHRM) interpretation of its own 
regulation. 'Thus, DHRM's application of that rule was reasonable and rational. 
Accordingly, we conclude that DHRM did not abuse its discretion in determining that 
Holland was not eligible for automatic reappointment under that rule." Id. 
Public Safety has interpreted its pursuit policy as creating an enforceable definition 
of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. Whether or not a pursuit occurred was determined 
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by considering the circumstances of the particular incident. This is a reasonable and 
rational application of Public Safety's pursuit policy. 
This standard is one against which the actions of an officer can be considered. 
Given the facts surrounding a particular incident, a determination can be made as to 
whether an officer had engaged in a vehicular pursuit. No officer is required by the 
policy to pursue a suspect against his or her best judgment. But where a pursuit has 
occurred, the officer can be required to have followed the requirements of the policy. 
The CSRB erred in holding that, by definition, a vehicular pursuit only takes place 
when an officer says that it did. Under this definition, Public Safety's pursuit policy 
becomes unenforceable as shown by this case. CSRB held that Pace was not involved in 
a vehicular pursuit because Pace testified that he subjectively believed he was not 
involved in a pursuit. Part of this testimony was based on Pace's addition of a proximity 
requirement in his definition of a vehicular pursuit that does not appear in the actual 
policy. 
Under CSRB's interpretation of Public Safety's policy, the circumstances that 
convinced all prior reviewers of the March 14, 1999 incident that it was a pursuit, as that 
term is defined by policy, became irrelevant. The only significant fact under CSRB's 
interpretation is the testimony of the officer as to what he or she believed at the time. The 
result of CSRB's legal error is that Pace can avoid review of a pursuit done without 
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compliance with the pursuit policy by simply claiming that he did not believe it to be a 
pursuit. 
The State of Utah, Department of Public Safety asks this Court to reject CSRB's 
interpretation of Public Safety's definition of what constitutes a vehicular pursuit. This 
matter should be remanded to the CSRB with instructions to uphold the hearing officer's 
original determination that the department had substantiated the charge that Pace 
conducted a vehicular pursuit without complying with the requirements for a pursuit. The 
CSRB should be ordered on remand to reconsider whether, with this charge upheld, the 
20-day suspension imposed by Public Safety meets the proportionality standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons presented above, the CSRB's final agency action should be 
reversed and this matter should be remanded to the CSRB with instructions to uphold the 
department's charge that Pace violated Public Safety's vehicular pursuit policy. CSRB 
should be further instructed to reconsider the proportionality of the department's 20-day 
suspension. 
PETITIONER DOES NOT DESIRE ORAL 
ARGUMENT OR A PUBLISHED OPINION 
Petitioner does not request oral argument and a published opinion in this matter. 
The question raised by this petition not being such that oral argument or a published 
opinion are necessary, though the petitioner desires to participate in oral argument if such 
is held by the Court. 
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rW„ DATED this S day of November, 2003. 
BRENT A. BURNETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Petitioner 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
PETITIONER to the following this of November, 2003: 
JOEL A. FERRE 
MARK E. BURNS 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellee 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
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BEFORE THE STATE OF UTAH CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
TROOPER ROSS G. PACE, 
DECISION AND 
Respondent, : FINAL AGENCY ACTION 
v. : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF : 
PUBLIC SAFETY, : 
: Case Nos. 18 CSRB/H.0.262 (Step 5) 
Appellant. : 7 CSRB 64 (Step 6) 
On Tuesday, November 26, 2002, the Career Service Review Board (Board and CSRB) 
completed its appellate review of the above-entitled case with a hearing involving the parties and an 
executive session. The following Board Members were present and heard oral argument at the 
hearing and deliberated in an executive session: Blake S. Atkin, Chairman, Joan M. Gallegos, 
Dale L. Whittle, and Gloria E. Wheeler. At the hearing, Assistant Attorney General Laurie L. Noda 
represented the Department of Public Safety (Department/DPS/Appellant) with Lin Miller, Human 
Resource Director, present as the Department's Management Representative. Trooper Ross Pace 
(Grievant/Respondent) was present and presented oral argument on his own behalf. Accompanying 
Trooper Pace was his wife, Ramona Pace. 
AUTHORITY 
The Board's statutory authority is set forth in the Utah Code at §§67-19a-101 through -408 
(Supp. 1998) of the State Employees' Grievance and Appeal Procedures, which is a sub-part of the 
Utah State Personnel Management Act at §§67-19 et seq. The CSRB's administrative rules are 
published in the Utah Administrative Code at R137-1-1 through -23 (Supp. 1998). This Board-level 
or step 6 appeal hearing is the final administrative review in the State Employees' Grievance and 
Appeal Procedures for Trooper Pace's appeal from his 20-day suspension. Both the Board's 
evidentiary/Step 5 and these appellate/Step 6 proceedings are designated as "formal adjudications" 
pursuant to Rl 37-1-18(2)(a). Therefore, those provisions of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
(UAPA) pertaining to formal adjudications are applicable to the CSRB's Step 5 and Step 6 hearings. 
(§§63-46be/^.) 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On or about August 30,1999, Respondent was given a '"Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" that 
was signed by Lt. Bardell Hamilton, Commander of Field Section Seven, Utah Highway Patrol 
(UHP), where Respondent was employed. This ccNotice of Intent to Impose Discipline" was 
superceded by a second "Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline" which was dated 
November 29,1999, and signed by Richard A. Greenwood, Deputy Commissioner, Utah Department 
of Public Safety. This second notice of intent to discipline recommended that Respondent's 
employment with the Utah Highway Patrol be terminated.1 At the time these notices of intent were 
issued, Respondent had been employed as a Trooper with the Utah Highway Patrol for more than 
21 years. 
The November Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline recommended that Respondent be 
terminated based upon seven separate, unrelated charges all occurring in 1999. (Agency Ex. 4) 
The first of these charges alleged that on March 14,1999, Respondent was involved in a high 
speed chase that did not comply with DPS Policy 1-21 V relating to vehicle pursuits. In connection 
with this allegation, the Department alleged that Respondent further violated UHP Policy 33-08 by 
not completing an incident report prior to the end of his shift that day nor providing a copy of the 
video tape of the alleged high speed pursuit. {Id. at R.) 
The second charge alleged that on October 29, 1999, Respondent falsified his daily log by 
documenting that he was "in service" patrolling while actually eating lunch at Pasillas Cafe. The 
third charge alleged that Respondent falsified his weekly report for the week October 16 through 
October 22,1999. The fourth charge alleged that on May 25, 1999, Respondent failed to attend a 
mandatory section meeting in violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-6. The fifth charge 
alleged that on May 30,1999, Respondent was in violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 
and DPS Policy and Procedures VI-1, 6-10, by leaving his assigned duty area and working in his 
farm field. The sixth charge alleged that on August 19,1999, he was again working in a farm field 
in direct violation of UHP Rules and Regulations 3-1-10 and a direct order allegedly given to 
Respondent by Lt. Hamilton on August 12,1999, directing him to not work in his farm field while 
on duty. The seventh and final charge involved allegations concerning a late incident report dated 
November 4,1999. 
The Notice of Intent to Impose Discipline dated August 30,1999, recommended that Respondent be 
suspended without pay for 30 working days. 
Pace v. Public Safety, 7 CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action - Page 2 
After receiving the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline, Respondent requested 
a hearing with the Utah Department of Public Safety's Administrative Law Judge (ALT) 
J. Francis Valerga. This hearing took place on April 3 and April 5,2000. In a written opinion issued 
in April 2000, Judge Valerga partially sustained the Department's first charge. Specifically, 
Judge Valerga ruled that Respondent had engaged in a high speed chase and violated DPS Policy and 
Procedure 1-21 by failing to notify dispatch of the pursuit. However, the other two allegations 
specifically related to the high speed chase were dismissed. Specifically the allegations relating to 
Respondent's failure to provide an incident report involving the alleged high speed chase or a video 
tape were not sustained and dismissed. (Agency Ex. 2) 
Judge Valerga sustained the second charge against Respondent - that he failed to properly 
notify dispatch that he was taking a lunch break at Pasillas Cafe on October 29, 1999. He also 
sustained the third charge against Respondent relating to Respondent's failure to attend a mandatory 
section meeting on May 25,1999, in violation of UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-6. Judge Valerga 
further sustained the fourth and fifth charges set forth in the November 29,1999 Notice of Intent to 
Discipline alleging that Respondent violated UHP Rule and Regulation 3-1-10 and a direct order by 
working in his farm field on May 30,1999, and being in a farm field next to a tractor on August 19, 
1999. However, Judge Valerga did not sustain and overturned the third and seventh charges set forth 
in the November 29, 1999 Notice of Intent to Discipline letter that involved the falsifying of 
Respondent's weekly report and filing a late incident report. 
Based upon his findings, Judge Valerga recommended to Craig L. Dearden, then 
Commissioner of Public Safety, that Respondent's employment with the Department not be 
terminated and that he be reinstated to full employment with a 30-day suspension. (Id. at R.) 
Pursuant to Department policy, Respondent appealed the ALJ's Findings of Fact and 
recommendation of a 30-day suspension to Commissioner Craig Dearden. After reviewing and 
carefully considering the facts and information concerning this matter, Commissioner Craig Dearden 
entered a Final Order that Respondent be suspended for 20 days and undergo a fitness for duty 
psychological examination as well as a transfer to a new section. (Agency Ex. 1) 
On about June 5, 2000, Respondent timely filed his appeal of Commissioner Dearden's 
decision with the CSRB. 
Pace v. Public Safety, 7CSRB 64, Decision and Final Agency Action Page 3 
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD 
On November 29 and 30,2000, a Step 5 evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB Hearing 
Officer Katherine A. Fox (Hearing Officer). At the hearing, Respondent represented himself pro se 
and was assisted by his wife, Ramona Pace. The Department was represented by Assistant Attorney 
General Laurie L. Noda, who was assisted by the Department's management representative, 
Lt. Bardell Hamilton (Hamilton), Commander of UHP Section Seven. 
At the hearing, the Hearing Officer received evidence concerning the five remaining charges 
against Respondent. Specifically, there was testimony given and received concerning the Pasillas 
Cafe incident occurring on October 29, 1999; Respondent's failure to attend a mandatory section 
meeting on May 25,1999; the two farm field incidents occurring on May 30, and August 19,1999 
respectively; and finally, there was testimony given and received concerning the alleged high speed 
pursuit incident which occurred on March 14, 1999. 
At the conclusion of this hearing, the Hearing Officer issued -her Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decision (Initial Decision) dated December 20, 2000. In this Initial 
Decision, the Hearing Officer specifically reviewed the five remaining charges against Respondent 
and concluded that there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that "the Department's 
imposed discipline is [was] appropriate in this case." (Initial Decision at p.5, Conclusion 11.) 
On January 11,2001, Respondent filed a Request for Request for Reconsideration pursuant 
Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-21(12). On March 13, 2001, the Hearing Officer denied 
Respondent's Request for Reconsideration. 
Respondent then appealed the Hearing Officer's decision to the Board.2 In this appeal before 
the Board, Respondent essentially challenged the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision on two primary 
grounds. First, Respondent argued that there was not substantial evidence to support the specific 
charges against him and that the Hearing Officer erred by concluding that there was. Second, 
Respondent argued that even if there was substantial evidence to support the Hearing Officer's Initial 
Decision, the imposition of a 20-day suspension was disproportionate in relation to the charges 
against him and in light of the discipline imposed on other individuals for similar acts of misconduct. t 
2This appeal was timely filed with the CSRB on March 26,2001. As a point of clarification, it should be 
pointed out that throughout this Final Decision, Mr. Pace is referred to as the Respondent However, as is evident 
from the procedural history of this case, in the Initial Decision of the Hearing Officer, the Deparment's allegations ( 
and proposed discipline were upheld and appealed by Mr. Pace. Thus, Mr. Pace was the appellant during the prior 
Step 6 proceedings before the Board. 
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On April 24,2002, the Board completed its Step 6 review of Respondent's original appeal 
with a hearing involving all the parties and by meeting in an executive session. On May 22,2002, 
the Board issued its Decision and Order of Remand in this case. This Decision and Order of Remand 
significantly modified and amended the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision. 
In its Order of Remand, the Board specifically overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's 
Initial Decision relating to two of the allegations against Respondent. Specifically, with respect to 
the High Speed Pursuit Incident,3 the Board overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial 
Decision because the Board did not believe that the Department's policies, rules or procedures were 
correctly applied to the facts associated with this allegation.4 
The Board also overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect 
to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident. Again, with respect to this charge, the Board found 
reversible error in the Hearing Officer's application of the Department's policies or rules to the facts 
surrounding this incident. Because the Board found that the applicable policies and rules were not 
correctly applied with respect to the May 30,1999, Farm Field Incident, the Hearing Officer's Initial 
Decision with respect to this allegation was overturned and vacated.5 
In addition to overturning the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the High 
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30, 1999, Farm Field Incident, the Board used its discretion 
under Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(a) to correct the factual findings relied upon by the 
Hearing Officer to sustain the Department's allegation relating to the August 19,1999 Farm Field 
Tractor Incident. The Board then remanded this specific allegation to the Hearing Officer with the 
corrected facts and instructions for the Hearing Officer to revisit her findings with respect to this 
allegation and to render a decision properly weighing and considering the facts as corrected by the 
Board. 
As set forth in the Board's May 22,2002 Decision and Order of Remand, in order to enhance clarity, the 
Board has determined to use the same title or label the Hearing Officer used in addressing the allegations against 
Respondent. For example, in the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision, the Hearing Officer addresses the first charge 
against Respondent as the High Speed Pursuit Incident. The Board in this Final Decision will use the same 
identifying titles or labels as it relates to the allegations against Respondent. 
4This decision was rendered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(b) which allows the 
Board to determine whether the CSRB Hearing Officer correctly applied the relevant policies or rules to the facts of 
the case. This review is done on a correctness standard with the Board giving no deference to the hearing officer's 
decision. 
This decision was rendered pursuant to the same administrative rule as cited in the previous footnote. 
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Finally, the Board upheld the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision sustaining the Department's 
allegations with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Respondent's Failure to Attend a 
Mandatory Section Meeting Incident. However, because the Board's Decision and Order of Remand 
significantly modified and amended the Hearing Officers Initial Decision, the Board ordered the 
case remanded to the Hearing Officer to make a decision as to the appropriate and proportionate 
discipline that should be imposed upon Respondent in light of the Board's modification to the 
Hearing Officer's Initial Decision.6 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. REMANDED EVIDENTIARY ISSUES AND DECISION ON REMAND 
The Board remanded this case to the Hearing Officer on two evidentiary issues.7 First, the 
Board remanded the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the August 19, 1999 Farm 
Field Tractor Incident to make findings and a decision that considered the facts as corrected by the 
Board. By this Order, the Board was not overturning or vacating the Hearing Officer's Initial 
Decision with respect to the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. Rather, the Board was 
simply requiring that the Hearing Officer revisit this allegation and make her decision using the facts 
as corrected by the Board.8 
Recognizing that the Hearing Officer was in the best position to weigh the evidence, even 
with the corrected facts, and to judge the veracity of the various witnesses' statements, the Board 
remanded this allegation to the Hearing Officer for further review. The final decision as to whether 
there was substantial evidence to support this allegation remained with the Hearing Officer. The 
6The Board felt that this remand was appropriate because the 20-day suspension imposed upon Respondent 
was based upon the Hearing Officer's sustaining of all five of the Department's allegations against him. Because the 
Board had overturned and vacated two of the most severe allegations against Respondent, the Board felt a review by 
the Hearing Officer of the discipline imposed by the Department was required. This was especially true in light of 
the fact that evidence during the Step 5 hearing established that the Trooper with whom Respondent had lunch at 
Pasillas Cafe only received a one-day suspension for that incident. Also, with respect to Respondent's failure to 
attend the mandatory section meeting, the Board noted that another trooper who missed that same section meeting 
was not disciplined and that in more than twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had never 
missed a previous mandatory section meeting. 
7This remand was ordered pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(7). 
8In her "Decision on Remand," the Hearing Officer states the following: "The hearing officer fully 
acknowledges that she failed to record the fact that Grievant did indeed deny that he had been given a verbal order 
and she sincerely regrets this mistake By way of explanation rather than excuse, what was clear in the transcript 
was not so clear during this hearing." (Decision on Remand, P.2, Footnote 1) 
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only requirement placed upon her by the Board was that she weigh and consider the corrected facts 
in making her decision. 
The second evidentiary issue to be addressed by the Hearing Officer on remand concerned 
the proportionality or severity of the discipline imposed upon Respondent in light of the Board's 
Decision and Order of Remand. This issue became necessary because the Board overturned and 
vacated two of the five allegations sustained by the Hearing Officer and remanded a third allegation 
to the Hearing Officer for further deliberation. These facts necessitated that the Hearing Officer 
review the record as a whole and make a determination as to whether a 20-day suspension was 
proportionate in light of the Board's Decision and Order of Remand. 
On June 7,2002, the Hearing Officer entered her Decision on Remand. Consistent with the 
Board's Decision and Order of Remand, the Hearing Officer's remanded decision considered only 
the allegations not previously dismissed or vacated by the Board. Moreover, in her remanded 
decision, the Hearing Officer appropriately incorporated and considered the corrected facts given to 
her by the Board in analyzing the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. 
In the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand, she significantly amended and modified the 
discipline imposed upon Respondent. With respect to the two allegations sustained by the Board, 
specifically the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting 
Incident, the Hearing Officer imposed a one-day suspension. The Hearing Officer based this one-day 
suspension on the fact that another trooper only received a one-day suspension for identical 
infractions.9 In reducing the discipline to a one-day suspension without pay, the Hearing Officer also 
considered the fact that in nearly twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had 
never missed a previous mandatory section meeting. 
With respect to the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident, the Hearing Officer 
modified her Initial Decision with respect to this allegation and reduced the discipline imposed upon 
Respondent to a written reprimand. After reviewing the evidentiary record, the Hearing Officer 
determined that there was considerable uncertainty as to whether Respondent disobeyed a direct 
order that ultimately gave rise to the allegation supporting the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor 
The evidence in the record establishes that Trooper Brown received a one-day suspension for engaging in 
the same conduct that Respondent was alleged to have participated in with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident. 
Apparently aggravating Trooper Brown's discipline in connection with this incident was the fact that he also made 
"inappropriate comments to another Agency on the radio." Trooper Brown was not disciplined for failure to attend 
the same mandatory section meeting. 
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Incident. The Hearing Officer concluded that there was evidence to support that a "less formal" 
order was given to Respondent directing him to stay out of his farm field and that the "offhand 
manner" in which the order was issued caused Respondent to not remember receiving such an order. 
Based upon these facts, the Hearing Officer reduced the discipline imposed upon Respondent with 
respect to this allegation to a written reprimand.10 
B. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In the Department's appeal before the Board, the Department asserts that the imposition of 
a one-day suspension and written reprimand are not appropriate given the policy violations sustained 
by the Board.11 Specifically, the Department states at page 7 of their brief12 that "It is the Agency's 
[Department's] position that the totality of violations must be viewed when making any assessment 
as to disciplinary action in this case and that the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision upholding the 
twenty-day suspension was appropriate and should be sustained by the Board when viewed in the 
context in which it was given, i.e., the entire suspension was imposed on the basis of five cumulative 
incidents." (Agency's Brief to the Board at p.7) 
Concerning the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident, the Department argues that 
even considering the facts as corrected by the Board in its Decision and Order of Remand, the 
Hearing Officer erred by imposing only a written reprimand for this violation. The Department 
argues that there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Department's decision with 
respect to this allegation and that because Respondent's actions were "serious and there was no 
evidence that a written reprimand was appropriate," the Hearing Officer's decision to impose a 
written reprimand was in error. (Id) 
In addition to these issues, the Department also challenges the Board's original Decision and 
Order of Remand that overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision concerning the 
High Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30, Farm Field Incident. With respect to the High Speed 
Pursuit Incident, the Department argues that the Board erred in its Decision and Order of Remand 
by placing "undue emphasis" on the discretionary aspect of the policy governing high speed pursuits. 
10Hearing Officer Decision on Remand at Page 3 and 4. 
11
 As stated previously, only the Pasillas Caf<§ Incident and the incident involving Respondent's failure to 
attend a mandatory section meeting were folly sustained by the Board. 
12The Department entitles their brief "Agency's Brief To The Board In Opposition To The Board's 
Decision And Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand." 
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The Department argues that the primary focus should have been on the actions taken by Respondent, 
not his intent. (Id, at 3) 
With respect to the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident, the Department argues that the Board 
erred by substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer. (Id, at 5) The 
Department bases this argument on the fact that the Hearing Officer's factual findings were not 
"clearly erroneous." (Id.)13 
In essence, the Department challenges the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand on the 
following grounds. First, the Department asserts that the imposition of a twenty-day suspension was 
appropriate based upon the number of incidents alleged against Respondent and the nature of the 
policy violations he committed. Second, the Department asserts that the factual evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the allegations supporting the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. The 
Department asserts that because substantial evidence exists to support this allegation, the Hearing 
Officer erred by reducing the discipline to a written reprimand. Finally, the Department challenges 
the Board's original Decision and Order of Remand with respect to the High Speed Pursuit Incident 
and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. The Department argues that substantial evidence exists 
to support these allegations and that the Board erred in overturning and vacating these allegations. 
C. THE BOARD'S APPELLATE STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
We review the Department's appeal under Utah Administrative Code R137-l-22(4)(a) 
through (c), (Supp. 2000), which reads as follows: 
(a) The board shall first make a determination of whether the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and rational according to the substantial 
evidence standard. When the board determines that the factual findings of the 
CSRB hearing officer are not reasonable and rational based on the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, then the board may, in its discretion, correct 
the factual findings, and/or make new or additional factual findings. 
It should also be noted at this time that the Department's brief on appeal to the Board concerning the 
Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand addresses issues that are not necessarily proper for appeal to the Board. 
Specifically, the Board previously overturned and vacated the Department's allegations with respect to the High 
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer 
appropriately does not revisit these two allegations. On remand, she made no ruling or decision with respect to these 
two allegations and therefore, there if nothing for the Department to appeal to the Board relating to these two 
allegations at this time. The Board believes without deciding that these issues can be appealed to the Utah Court of 
Appeals once a Final Decision has been issued by the Board. 
It appears that the Department's efforts to raise these issues at this point before the Board is an effort to 
have the Board reconsider their Decision and Order of Remand. Reconsiderations are authorized pursuant to Utah 
Administrative Code, R137-l-21(12). For these reasons, the Board will address the Department's concerns with 
respect to the High Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident in this Decision and Final 
Agency Action. 
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(b) Once the board has either determined that the factual findings of the CSRB 
hearing officer are reasonable and rational or has corrected the factual findings 
based upon the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the board must then determine 
whether the CSRB hearing officer has correctly applied the relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes in accordance with the correctness standard, with no deference being 
granted to the evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB hearing officer. 
(c) Finally, the board must determine whether the decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer, including the totality of the sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable 
and rational based upon the ultimate factual findings and correct application of 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes determined according to the above provisions. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Board must first determine whether the Hearing Officer's 
factual findings are reasonable and rationally based upon the evidentiary record as a whole and 
whether those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Next, our task is to review the fact 
finder's decision to determine whether the Hearing Officer correctly applied "the relevant policies, 
rules, and statutes according to the correctness standard," giving no deference to the Hearing Officer 
on this legal issue. Finally, the Board's appellate role is to consider whether the totality of the 
disciplinary sanction imposed by the Hearing Officer is reasonable and rational based upon our 
determination of the ultimate facts together with the correct application of relevant State policies, 
rules and statutes which were considered by our Hearing Officer. 
BOARD REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 
1. REVIEW OF THE HEARING OFFICER'S IMPOSITION 
OF A ONE-DAY SUSPENSION AND WRITTEN REPRIMAND 
On appeal, the Board must now determine whether the totality of the sanctions imposed by 
the Hearing Officer in her Decision on Remand are reasonable and rational based upon the facts of 
this case. {Utah Administrative Code R137-l-22(4)(c))14 In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing 
Officer imposed a one-day suspension against Respondent for the Pasillas Cafe Incident and for 
Respondent's Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident. (Decision on Remand at p. 4) 
The Hearing Officer reached this decision in light of the Board's Decision and Order on Remand 
which overturned and vacated two of the five allegations against Respondent. (Id.) 
With respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Respondent's Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section 
Meeting Incident, the Board has already ruled that there was substantial evidence as required by Utah Administrative 
Code, Rl37-1-22(a) to support the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to these two allegations. Again, 
these two allegations were remanded to the Hearing Officer only to determine whether the discipline imposed upon 
Respondent was reasonable and rational in light of the Board's Decision and Order on Remand. 
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In reaching her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer appropriately considered that 
another trooper who also failed to attend the mandatory section meeting and to check out with 
dispatch when going on break with Respondent at Pasillas Cafe received only a one-day suspension 
for those policy violations. (Id) Finally, in her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer considered 
the fact that in nearly twenty-two years of service with the Department, Respondent had never 
missed a prior mandatory section meeting. (Id) 
After carefully reviewing the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand and considering the 
evidentiary record as a whole, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's imposition of a one-day 
suspension in connection with the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section 
Meeting Incident. The evidentiary record establishes that Respondent did not check out with 
dispatch when going on a break at Pasillas Cafe. (T.I., 356-358) This incident occurred after the 
Department issued a memorandum stating that all officers in Respondent's section were required to 
check out with dispatch prior to going on break. (T.I. 152-155; Agency Ex.9)15 The evidentiary 
record also clearly establishes that Respondent failed to attend a mandatory section meeting on 
May 25,1999, after being given a direct order to do so. 
Finally, with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and Respondent's Failure to Attend a 
Mandatory Section Meeting Incident, the record also establishes that another trooper who was 
involved in the same conduct as Respondent received only a one-day suspension for his actions. 
(T.II, 269,271 & 379) Specifically, the evidentiary record establishes that Trooper Paul Brown, who 
accompanied Respondent to Pasillas Cafe and also failed to check out with dispatch before going 
on this break received a one-day suspension for this policy violation. (T. II, 271, 379).16 Trooper 
Brown also failed to attend the same mandatory section meeting as Respondent, but was not 
disciplined for doing so. (T.II, 269, 271) Finally, the record establishes that in nearly twenty-two 
years of service with the Department, Trooper Pace had never missed a prior mandatory section 
meeting. (T.ffl 361) 
The Pasillas Cafg Incident occurred on October 29,1999. The memorandum instructing troopers to check 
out with dispatch prior to going on break was dated July 15,1999. 
The evidentiary record establishes that Trooper Brown received a one-day suspension. However, it 
appears that this one-day suspension was given in connection with the Pasilla's CafS Incident and for "inappropriate 
comments made to another agency on the radio." (Id) (Emphasis added) 
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Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-21(3)(b) allows the hearing officer to determine 
whether the agency's decision, including any disciplinary sanction imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate or otherwise constitutes an abuse of discretion. In her Decision on Remand, the 
Hearing Officer exercised her authority under this rule and reduced the disciplinary sanction imposed 
upon Respondent for these allegations to a one-day suspension. 
Pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(c), the Board finds the Hearing 
Officer's decision to impose a one-day suspension for the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to 
Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident is reasonable and rational based upon the ultimate 
factual findings in this case. Therefore, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's Decision on 
Remand to impose a one-day suspension with respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure 
to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident. 
2. AUGUST 19,1999 FARM FIELD TRACTOR INCIDENT 
In the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision, she sustained this allegation primarily on the 
mistaken finding of fact that Respondent never denied receiving a verbal directive from his 
lieutenant to stay out of his farm field.17 In her Initial Decision, the Hearing Officer states: 
[Appellant] did not deny that he had been given a verbal directive by Lt. Hamilton 
on August 12, to stay out of his fields. His defense appears to be that there is no 
written record of the meeting and Lt. Hamilton could not remember all the details 
relating to this meeting when the order was issued, i.e., whether it was on break or 
in the office. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision at p. 8) 
Later on that same page, the Hearing Officer again states: 
Neither does he dispute that prior to the incident, he was given a verbal order by 
Lt. Hamilton. (Id. at R.) 
In its Order of Remand, the Board noted that the Hearing Officer's factual conclusions with 
respect to this allegation were not supported by the record transcript and did not accurately reflect 
Respondent's testimony at the evidentiary hearing on this issue. The Board noted that in the 
evidentiary hearing on this matter, Respondent not only denied that such an order was given him by 
his lieutenant,18 but in an apparent attempt to show the Hearing Officer that this verbal order never 
17The position of the Department at the evidentiary hearing was that this verbal directive was given to 
Respondent by his lieutenant on August 12,1999. (T.II, 389-391) 
18Page 351 provides as follows: On page 351 of the hearing transcript, Appellant testified as follows: 
MR. PACE: Nowhere on this log does it show that I met with Lieutenant 
Hamilton. I don't ever remember a meeting with Lieutenant Hamilton as far as a 
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occurred, Respondent spent considerable time at the evidentiary hearing attempting to show that 
Lt. Hamilton and Respondent were never together on August 12,1999. (T.I, 128; II, 350) 
In the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand, she appropriately considered and reviewed the 
facts as set forth in the Board's Decision and Order of Remand. After reviewing this evidentiary 
record, the Hearing Officer determined that there was substantial uncertainty as to whether 
Respondent in fact disobeyed a direct order to stay of his farm fields. (Decision on Remand at p.3) 
In her Decision on Remand, the Hearing Officer concluded that any such directive given to 
Respondent was given in a less "formal" manner than would normally be the case when a trooper 
receives a direct order from his supervisor. (Id.) The Hearing Officer concluded that because of the 
informal or "off-hand" manner in which the directive was given, said directive never registered with 
Respondent. (Id.) 
In reaching this conclusion, the Hearing Officer focused on a number of factors including the 
fact that Lt. Hamilton failed to "log" any such directive or order in his log book and on the fact that 
he could not recall where or at what time on August 12, the alleged directive was given to 
Respondent. (Id) The Hearing Officer also noted that at the time such directive was given to 
Respondent, Lt. Hamilton was winding up his work so that he could leave on vacation. (Id) Finally, 
the Hearing Officer noted in her Decision on Remand that at the time such directive was given to 
Respondent, the relationship between Lt. Hamilton and Respondent had deteriorated to the point 
where communication between the two men had become hostile and largely ineffective. (Id) 
The cumulative effect of all of these factors led the Hearing Officer to conclude in her 
Decision on Remand that any such directive given to Respondent by Lt. Hamilton was given in an 
informal or "off-hand" manner so that any such order never registered with Respondent. Based upon 
these facts, the Hearing Officer imposed a written reprimand against Respondent for his conduct in 
relation to the August 19,1999 Farm Field Tractor Incident. (Id. at 4) 
verbal direct order to not be in any field. 
HEARING OFFICER: Is your testimony that nowhere on 8/12/99 do you 
remember a meeting? 
MR. PACE: That's correct, I don't remember any meeting and I don't 
remember getting a verbal direct order from — 
HEARING OFFICER: On this day? 
MR. PACE: —Hamilton. On any day. 
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As stated previously, the Board's obligation on review is to first make the determination on 
whether the factual findings of the Hearing Officer with respect this allegation are reasonable and 
rational according to the substantial evidence standard. (R137-l-22(4)(a)) 
On remand from the Board, the Hearing Officer clearly reviewed and considered the 
testimony from both Respondent and Lt. Hamilton as to whether Respondent had received an order 
from Lt. Hamilton to stay out of his farm fields. In making her factual determination, the Hearing 
Officer reviewed the testimony set forth in the evidentiary record and considered the facts in light 
of the Board's remand with respect to this allegation. After thoroughly reviewing the testimony of 
the witnesses, the Hearing Officer concluded that, though Respondent had been directed to stay out 
of his farm field, this directive was given in such an informal or "off-hand" manner as to not fully 
register with Respondent. 
Applying the Board's previously cited standard of review, we hold that the Hearing Officer's 
findings in her Decision on Remand with respect to this allegation are reasonable and rational in 
view of the record as a whole. Moreover, with respect to findings of fact, this Board has consistently 
held that the factfinder is entitled to presumption of correctness. Jones v. Utah Department of 
Public Safety, 4 CSRB 38 (1992) See, generally Parks and Recreation v. Anderson, 3 PRB 22 at 
p.7-8 (1986); Utah Department of Transportation vs. Rasmussen, 2 PRB 19 at p.10-11(1986). 
After finding that the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to this allegation are 
supported by substantial evidence, the Board must now determine whether the totality of sanction 
imposed by the Hearing Officer in her Decision of Remand are reasonable and rational based on the 
facts of this case. (Utah Administrative Code, R137-l-22(4)(c)) In her Decision on Remand, the 
Hearing Officer ordered that Respondent be given a written reprimand for his failure to obey 
Lt Hamilton's informal directive that Respondent stay out of his farm field. 
After carefully considering the Hearing Officer's Decision on Remand and the evidentiary 
record as a whole, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's imposition of a written reprimand in 
connection with this incident. The evidentiary record clearly establishes that there was a strong 
disagreement between the parties as to whether or not Respondent actually received a directive on 
August 12,1999, from Lt. Hamilton to stay out of his farm field. (T.I, 31,79,128,148; T.II, 351) 
The record also establishes that Lt. Hamilton was clearly uncertain as to the time or place that he 
gave this directive to Respondent. (T.I, 128-129,390, & 397) Finally, the record also establishes that 
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Lt. Hamilton did not log any such directive in his log book and that the directive was given 
immediately proceeding a vacation that he was planning on taking. (Id.) 
Based upon the facts of this case, it appears that the Hearing Officer's imposition of a written 
reprimand is both reasonable and rational. The facts establish genuine uncertainty as to the formal 
nature of the direct order given to Respondent. The Board also notes that the Department imposed 
no discipline on Trooper Brown for his violation of a verbal order to attend a mandatory section 
meeting. The totality of the circumstances surrounding this incident convince the Board that the 
imposition of a written reprimand in connection with the August 19, 1999 Farm Field Tractor 
Incident is appropriate and the Board hereby sustains the Hearing Officer's decision regarding this 
incident. 
3- DEPARTMENT'S OPPOSITION TO THE BOARD'S DECISION TO OVERTURN AND VACATE THE 
HEARING OFFICER'S DECISION WITH RESPECT TO THE HIGH SPEED PURSUIT INCIDENT AND THE 
MAY 30,1999 FARM FIELD INCIDENT 
In its brief on appeal before the Board, the Department argues that the Board erred in 
overturning and vacating the Hearing Officer's Initial Decision with respect to the High Speed 
Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. With respect to the High Speed Pursuit 
Incident, the Department contends that the Board placed "undue emphasis" on the discretionary 
nature of the pursuit policy Respondent was alleged to have violated. The Department argues that 
the central focus should be on the actions taken by Respondent, not his intent. 
With respect to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident, the Department argues that the 
Department erred by substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer's. 
The Department bases this argument on the fact that the Hearing Officer's factual findings with 
respect to this incident were not "clearly erroneous." 
a. High Speed Pursuit Incident 
Respondent was charged with violating DPS Policy 1-21, Vehicle Pursuits. This policy 
provides in pertinent part as follows: 
V. PROCEDURES 
1. Any law enforcement officer in a department vehicle with operable 
emergency vehicle equipment and radio may initiate a vehicular pursuit 
when the following criteria are met: 
a. The suspect exhibits the intention to avoid 
apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics. 
b. The suspect operating the vehicle refuses to stop at the 
direction of the officer. 
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c. The suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue 
would further enhance the danger presented to the 
public. 
* * * 
B. Pursuit Officer Responsibilities: 
1. The pursuing officer shall activate headlights and all 
emergency equipment upon initiating pursuit. 
2. The pursuing officer shall immediately notify communications 
center personnel that a pursuit is underway. Use of plain English 
transmissions is encouraged, rather than using the ten-code. The 
officer shall provide communications center personnel with the 
following information: 
a. Unit identification; 
b. Location, speed, and direction of travel of the fleeing 
vehicle; 
c. Description and license plate number, if known of the 
pursued vehicle; 
d. Number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle, including 
descriptions, where possible; and 
e. Reason for initiating the pursuit 
(Department Ex.5) (Emphasis added) 
This policy clearly provides that a trooper or other law enforcement officer may initiate a 
vehicular pursuit only when one of the following criteria is met: The suspect exhibits the intention 
to avoid apprehension through evasive or unlawful tactics; the suspect operating the vehicle refuses 
to stop at the direction of the officer; or, the suspect's actions are such that failure to pursue would 
further enhance the danger presented to the public. 
Once the officer makes a subjective determination with respect to these issues, the officer 
must inform a "communications center" of the officer's unit identification; the location, speed, and 
direction of travel of the fleeing vehicle; a description and license plate number if known; the 
number of occupants in the fleeing vehicle including descriptions where possible; and finally, the 
reasons for initiating the pursuit. 
At the evidentiary hearing concerning this allegation, numerous witnesses including 
Col. Richard Greenwood, then Deputy Commission with the Department of Public Safety and 
Superintendent of the Utah Highway Patrol, testified that it is up to the trooper involved in a vehicle 
chase to determine whether the required elements are present to initiate a high speed pursuit. 
(T.I, 48) Consistent with Col. Greenwood's testimony, Trooper Steven Bytheway, Nolan Brown and 
Richard Henning all testified that it is the officer involved in the chase that makes the discretionary 
decision of whether to initiate a "pursuit" under Department policy. (T.n, 262-263; 282; 303) 
In the instant case, the most credible evidence concerning Respondent's intent with respect 
to this incident is his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, Respondent testified 
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that throughout the incident giving rise to this allegation, the vehicle he was chasing was 
approximately three-quarters to a mile ahead of him. (T.II, 331-334) He also testified that 
throughout much of this incident he had no visual contact with the car he was chasing because they 
were traveling on a winding mountain road. (T.II, 228-229) It was not until the chase's final half 
mile or "the last minute" that Respondent realized the driver he was chasing was actively trying to 
avoid apprehension. (T.II, 331-334) 
At that point, just when Respondent believed the chase was turning into a "10-80" pursuit 
according to DPS policy, the driver pulled into a rest area and came to a stop. (Id.) Because of these 
facts, Respondent testified that during most of this chase, he was not certain whether the suspect 
knew he was being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension; or, if the suspect 
was just simply continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed, unaware that Respondent was 
chasing him. (Id.) 
The Department argues that the "actions taken" by Respondent conclusively establish that 
he was involved in a high speed pursuit under DPS Policy 1-21 V and that because he did not inform 
a "communications center" of his unit identification; location, speed or direction of travel; 
description of the license plate number of the vehicle he was pursuing; or, the reason for initiating 
pursuit, he was in violation of this policy. The Board is not persuaded by this argument. 
The Respondent's actions with respect to this incident simply do not, in and of themselves, 
establish that he was involved in a high speed pursuit pursuant to DPS Policy 1-21 V. This is 
especially true when one closely examines the facts of this case. The record establishes that the 
pursuit occurred on a curvy, mountain road. (T.II, 328-329) The individual that Respondent was 
chasing was approximately three-quarters to one mile ahead of him during most of the pursuit. (Id. 
at 331-334) Because of these conditions, Respondent testified that there were long periods of time 
where he lost complete visual contact with the car he was chasing. (Id.) Finally, Respondent 
testified that during most of this chase, he, himself, was not certain whether the suspect knew he was 
being pursued by Respondent and thus trying to avoid apprehension, or if the suspect was simply 
continuing to travel at a very high rate of speed, unaware of Respondent's pursuit. (Id.) 
Upon review of its prior Decision and Order of Remand, the Board finds no legal justification 
to reverse its prior decision with respect to this allegation. In reaching its initial Decision and Order 
of Remand, the Board thoroughly and completely examined and reviewed all of the evidence relied 
on by the Hearing Officer in reaching her Initial Decision in which she sustained this allegation. The 
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Board reviewed Respondent's Incident Report filed with respect to this incident and also read the 
administrative law judge's level four decision in this matter. The Department's Pursuit Review 
Board's Findings were reviewed by the Board and extensively discussed in their Decision and Order 
of Remand as was the testimony from the other witnesses who testified that after reviewing the 
record, they believed Respondent was involved in a high speed chase. 
All of these factors were weighed and considered by the Board in reaching its initial Decision 
and Order of Remand. The policy relied upon by the Department clearly provides that it is not until 
an officer involved in chase makes a subjective determination that the individual they are chasing 
is attempting to avoid apprehension or refusing to stop that they may initiate a pursuit. (Emphasis 
added) 
The evidence in this case establishes that Respondent never made that subjective 
determination. Close review of the facts surrounding this incident give real credibility to 
Respondent's testimony that he did not believe he was involved in a high speed pursuit as outlined 
in DPS Policy 1-21V. Without that subjective determination being made, substantial evidence does 
not support a finding that a high speed pursuit occurred. 
b. May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident 
In their brief on appeal, the Department argues that the Board erred with respect to this 
allegation for substituting its assessment of the evidence for that of the Hearing Officer's. The 
Department argues the Board cannot do this unless the Hearing Officer's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous. (Department Brief at p.5) 
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the Board did not substitute its "assessment of the 
evidence" for that of the Hearing Officer. On page 16 of the Board's Decision and Order of Remand, 
the Board stated as follows: 
"After carefully reviewing the evidentiary record as a whole, this Board finds that 
the Hearing Officer's factual findings with respect to this incident are reasonable 
and rational and can be supported by substantial evidence." 
The Board did, however,, find reversible error in the Hearing Officer's application of the 
Department's policies or rules to the facts surrounding this incident. Because the Board found that 
the applicable policies and rules were not correctly applied in connection with the May 30, 1999 
Farm Field Incident, the Board overturned and vacated the Hearing Officer's decision with respect 
to this incident. 
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In its Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Department charged Respondent with violating UHP 
Regulation 3-1-10 and DPS Policy and Procedure VI-1,6-10. These policies essentially require that 
officers devote their on duty time to the completion of their tasks. 
At the evidentiary hearing on this matter, Col. Richard Greenwood testified that it would not 
be a violation of these policies for a trooper to be in his farm field if he was on break. (T.I, 53) 
Specifically, on cross-examination, Col. Greenwood was asked "If I can show that I am on break 
during the time they supposedly saw me in my field, am I allowed to be out in my field on break? 
A. I-If you're on break, yeah." {Id. at R.) Moreover, the record established that at the time 
Respondent was seen in his farm field on May 30,1999, he was, in fact, on break. (Gvt. Ex.9)19 
As stated previously, in reaching its decision to overturn and vacate the Hearing Officer's 
decision with respect to this incident, the Board ruled that the Hearing Officer failed to correctly 
apply relevant policies, rules and statutes. The Board did not substitute its assessment of the 
evidence for that of the Hearing Officer. It simply reviewed and considered all the evidence in the 
record according to the correctness standard as required by Utah Administrative Code, R137-1-22. 
Finally, the Board notes that with respect to the May 30, 1999 Farm Field Incident, the 
Department's Notice of Intent to Discipline dated November 29,1999, does not specifically charge 
Respondent with violating a direct order. However, the specific language set forth in the allegation 
surrounding this incident states that "On August 12,1999, Lt. Hamilton specifically told you that 
under no circumstances were you to work in your farm field while on duty." (Agency Ex.4) 
At the time the Board rendered its Decision and Order of Remand, it was aware that violating 
a direct order was not one of the specific charges used against Respondent with respect to the 
May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. However, because the Department chose to use such language 
in its Notice of Intent to Discipline, the Board felt compelled to address this issue.20 
In its Decision and Order of Remand the Board felt that applicable policies and rules were 
not correctly applied by the Hearing Officer with respect to this incident, and therefore, overturned 
In its brief, the Department appears to argue that by considering Gvt. Ex.9, it is substituting "its 
assessment of the evidence" for that of the Hearing Officer. This is simply not the case. The Hearing Officer's 
Initial Decision focuses solely on the fact of whether Respondent was in fact in his farm field on May 30,1999. 
Once the Hearing Officer reached her conclusion that he was in fact in his farm field on that day, she concluded that 
the Department had produced substantial evidence to prove its charge. (Initial Decision at p. 12) 
20 
Indeed, in footnote 17 of their Decision and Order of Remand, the Board expresses its concern that the 
Department would attempt to support any allegations surrounding the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident on a verbal 
order given nearly three months after the facts giving rise to that allegation. 
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and vacated her decision. After careful reconsideration and review of the Board's initial finding with 
respect to this allegation, the Board believes there is no legal justification to overturn its prior 
decision. 
DECISION 
The Board has addressed each of the issues raised by the Department in their appeal. After 
thoroughly reviewing the evidentiary record, the Board sustains the Hearing Officer's decision with 
respect to the Pasillas Cafe Incident and the Failure to Attend a Mandatory Section Meeting Incident 
The Board further finds that the Hearing Officer's decision with respect to the August 19,1999 Farm 
Field Tractor Incident is supported by substantial evidence and is sustained. Though not properly 
on appeal before the Board, the Board considered and reviewed its decision with respect to the High 
Speed Pursuit Incident and the May 30,1999 Farm Field Incident. After careful consideration, the 
Board finds no legal justification to overturn its prior decision with respect to these incidents. 
DATED this 28th day of January 2003. 
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